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Defaults in pension enrolment and organ-donation consent

Studies of pension enrollment and organ-donation consent found that the rule applying when people do nothing strongly shapes outcomes. Consent rates differ far more than actual donation rates, and the reasons are debated.

November 2003. Johnson and Goldstein, Science, 21 November 2003. Madrian and Shea (2001) and Davidai and colleagues (2012) are the related studies. Chronology section: 1990 to 2009.

StudyDocumentedDecisions

Where it sits
Academic psychologyResearch published for other researchers and students.
Evidence level
DocumentedThe event or practice is documented by primary or authoritative sources.
Sources inspected
3 of 32 with the relevant text, company document or archive item checked, 1 as an abstract or reference article, 0 not verified.

What happened

In 2001 Madrian and Shea reported higher 401(k) participation at a large US company after it moved from opt-in to automatic enrollment. In November 2003 Johnson and Goldstein published a Science policy forum comparing organ-donation consent in European countries with opt-in and opt-out rules, plus an online experiment. In 2012 Davidai, Gilovich and Ross studied what default options mean to people.

The psychological idea

A default is the outcome that applies when a person takes no action. Johnson and Goldstein offered three explanations: people may read the default as a recommendation, changing it takes effort, and the default is the status quo, so a change may feel like a loss. Davidai and colleagues added that a default changes what donating or not donating means.

In practice

In Johnson and Goldstein's online experiment (161 respondents), 42 per cent consented under opt-in, 82 per cent under opt-out and 79 per cent with no default. Effective consent was 4.25 per cent in Denmark and 12 per cent in Germany, both opt-in, against 99.98 per cent in Austria, which used opt-out. Madrian and Shea found participation significantly higher under automatic enrollment, with many employees keeping the default contribution rate and investments.

Why it mattered

Johnson and Goldstein described defaults as something every policy must have, and argued that the choice of default is a policy question with costs on both sides, because each default can misclassify some people. They concluded that defaults make a large difference to consent.

Limits and qualifications

Consent rates are not donation rates. Johnson and Goldstein list family objections, doctors' hesitancy and mismatch with recipients as reasons registered donors may not donate. Their regression on actual donations found a 16.3 per cent rise under presumed consent, from 14.1 to 16.4 per million, much smaller than the consent gap. Countries were not randomized. Davidai and colleagues used samples of 43 to 163 people, mostly students, and measured perceived meaning, not donation.

Evidence behind the claims

  • In Johnson and Goldstein's online experiment, 161 respondents were asked whether they would be donors; effective consent was 42 per cent under opt-in, 82 per cent under opt-out and 79 per cent in the neutral condition.

    Experimental findingSource: [1]Where: Defaults and Organ Donations, page 1338 and figure

  • Johnson and Goldstein's chart of effective consent rates shows 4.25 per cent for Denmark and 12 per cent for Germany (explicit consent) and 99.98 per cent for Austria (presumed consent); they report the four opt-in countries lower than the six opt-out countries with nearly 60 percentage points between the groups.

    DocumentedSource: [1]Where: Figure on page 1338 and text on page 1339

  • Johnson and Goldstein list family objections, doctors' hesitancy and recipient mismatch as reasons consent may not lead to donation, and report a 16.3 per cent increase in actual donation under presumed consent (14.1 to 16.4 per million, 1991 to 2001).

    DocumentedSource: [1]Where: Page 1339

  • Johnson and Goldstein offered three explanations for default effects: defaults may be read as suggestions, changing them takes effort, and defaults represent the status quo so changes involve loss aversion; they also say every policy must have a no-action default, that defaults can misclassify people, and that defaults make a large difference.

    InterpretationSource: [1]Where: Pages 1338 and 1339, Conclusions

  • Madrian and Shea studied 401(k) savings at a large US corporation before and after a switch to automatic enrollment and report participation significantly higher under automatic enrollment, with many employees keeping the default contribution rate and investment allocation.

    DocumentedSource: [2]Where: NBER working paper abstract; later published in the Quarterly Journal of EconomicsChecked at abstract level

  • Davidai, Gilovich and Ross report three studies in which opt-in or opt-out framing changed how people rated the significance of donating or not donating; the four samples ranged from 43 to 163 people, mostly Cornell students, and the measures were perceived meaning, not donation.

    Experimental findingSource: [3]Where: Abstract, studies and results

People involved

  • Eric Johnson. Decision researcher, Columbia University
  • Daniel Goldstein. Decision researcher, co-author of the Science forum piece
  • Brigitte Madrian. Economist, co-author of the 401(k) study
  • Dennis Shea. Co-author of the 401(k) study
  • Shai Davidai. Lead author of the 2012 study of what defaults mean

In the Psy101 course

This is course relevance only. It is not evidence for the historical or corporate claims on this page.See the full course map.

Sources and inspection

3 of 3 sources were opened and read at the level shown. A source marked as not verified supports no claim on this page by itself.

  1. [1]
    Do Defaults Save Lives?Johnson, E; Goldstein, D. Science 302(5649), 1338-1339 (copy hosted at dangoldstein.com), 2003. Journal article. Primary source.Relevant text checkedRead both pages (1338 and 1339) of the hosted PDF, including the figures and references.
  2. [2]
    The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings BehaviorMadrian, B; Shea, D. NBER Working Paper 7682 (published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 2001), 2000. Journal article. Primary source.Abstract or publisher record onlyRead the NBER abstract page as returned by the fetch tool. The page gives no participation figures, so none are stated. The journal version was not opened.
  3. [3]
    The meaning of default options for potential organ donorsDavidai, S; Gilovich, T; Ross, L. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109(38), 15201-15205 (PubMed Central), 2012. Journal article. Critique or replication.Relevant text checkedRead the open-access article on PubMed Central as returned by the fetch tool (abstract, study samples, results, qualifications). The sample sizes are as listed in that extract.

Access note: Madrian and Shea was read at abstract level only, so no participation percentages are given.

Independent source review: Claude review agent, independent of the research agent, 2026-10-21. Verdict: pass-with-edits.